How is Union added value scored in a CADA tender?

As proposed, Article 32 of the Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) would require contracting authorities to score "Union added value" as a non-price award

Summary As proposed, Article 32 of the Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) would require contracting authorities to score "Union added value" as a non-price award criterion in tenders for innovative cloud computing services and AI systems. Article 32(2) sets four conditions for how it must be applied — linked to the subject matter, not conferring unrestricted freedom of choice, expressly published, and ancillary and not decisive — and Article 32(3) sets out four assessment dimensions. "Ancillary and not decisive" means the criterion cannot dominate the award; Recital 67 suggests an indicative ceiling of 15 out of 120 points (12.5%).

Detail

Article 32 — headed "Union added value" — gives public buyers a structured way to reward a tenderer's contribution to a European cloud and AI ecosystem in procurement of innovative cloud computing services and AI systems, without displacing competitive, non-discriminatory procurement.

1. Mandatory inclusion for innovative procurement (Article 32(1))

Article 32(1) provides that, in procurement of innovative cloud computing services and AI systems, contracting authorities shall include, as part of the quality evaluation, non-price award criteria that allow them to evaluate the tenderer's contribution to the development of a European cloud and AI ecosystem. The duty is mandatory for the procurements in scope, and confined to innovative solutions.

2. Constraints on the criterion (Article 32(2))

To prevent the criterion from operating as disguised protectionism, Article 32(2) requires the non-price criteria to be:

linked to the subject matter of the contract;
not conferring unrestricted freedom of choice on the contracting authority — so the evaluation must be objective and bounded, not discretionary;
expressly set out in the procurement documents or contract notice — so tenderers know in advance how they will be scored; and
ancillary and not decisive in the award.

3. The four assessment dimensions (Article 32(3))

Without affecting authorities' discretion to apply additional criteria, Article 32(3) requires the criteria to let authorities evaluate the extent to which:

(a) the tenderer strengthens the Union digital technology supply chain, including using software or hardware designed or manufactured in the Union;
(b) the tenderer has integrated Union-developed technologies, including R&D results from Union-funded programmes, and uses Union-developed standards, specifications, software, models or other technology;
(c) the innovation required to deliver the service strengthens security of supply and the development of a European cloud and AI ecosystem; and
(d) the service is delivered, to the greatest extent feasible given market availability and technical requirements, through critical computing, storage and networking hardware designed and/or manufactured in the Union — or, where not feasible, through third-country hardware that contributes to security of supply and the European ecosystem.

Scoring: "ancillary and not decisive"

The phrase "ancillary and not decisive" (Article 32(2)(d)) is what shapes the scoring. A decisive criterion could, on its own, determine the winner; by making Union added value not decisive, the proposal ensures a tenderer with the better technical-and-financial offer cannot be rejected solely for a lower added-value score.

Article 32 sets no fixed weight. Recital 67 supplies the guidance: the criterion "should not be decisive" and should preserve the "primacy of technical and financial criteria directly connected to the performance requirements," and authorities "could consider a maximum weighting of 15 out of 120 points" within the overall methodology to keep it proportionate and subordinate. That is an indicative ceiling ("could consider"), not a binding figure — authorities retain discretion to set a lower weight, but should ensure the maximum available points cannot let added value overcome a real deficit in quality or price.

Implementation steps

To apply Article 32 in practice, an authority would:

Confirm scope — that the procurement is for innovative cloud computing services or AI systems.
Select dimensions from Article 32(3) relevant to the contract.
Draft objective, verifiable metrics — e.g. "share of critical hardware components designed in the Union" or "Union-funded R&D results integrated."
Set a subordinate weight, with the 15/120 indicative ceiling from Recital 67 as a reference.
Publish the criteria, weighting and method in the procurement documents or contract notice (Article 32(2)(c)).

A worked illustration

Suppose an authority procures an innovative AI system on a 120-point quality-and-price model and follows the Recital 67 indication: 15 points for Union added value, 105 points for technical quality and price. Within the 15-point added-value sub-criterion it could allocate, say, points across the Article 32(3) dimensions — supply-chain contribution (a), integration of Union-developed technology and Union-funded R&D (b), innovation for security of supply (c), and EU-origin critical hardware (d). Because the maximum added-value score (15) is small relative to the core criteria (105), a tenderer that loses every added-value point but leads decisively on quality and price can still win. That arithmetic is precisely what keeps the criterion "ancillary and not decisive." If, instead, an authority set added value at, say, 40 of 120 points, the criterion could flip close awards on origin grounds alone — which would sit uneasily with Article 32(2)(d). The figures above are illustrative; CADA does not mandate them.

The wider procurement-innovation context (Article 33)

Scoring under Article 32 connects to Article 33, under which Member States must monitor and report on their procurement of innovation in cloud and AI, pursue the objective that at least 25% of such procurement be awarded to innovative SMEs (Article 33(4)), and promote preliminary market consultations, matchmaking with European SMEs and start-ups, and SME-friendly contract clauses (Article 33(5)). When you design an Article 32 scoring model, doing so in a way that is accessible to SMEs — clear metrics, proportionate evidence requirements — supports these Article 33 objectives.

What this means for you

For public-sector procurement teams, Article 32 adds a strategic dimension to bid evaluation for innovative digital solutions: you must assess a tenderer's contribution to the European ecosystem, not only price and functionality.

This does not require buying only from EU vendors — Article 32(3)(d) expressly allows third-country hardware where EU hardware is not feasible, provided it contributes to security of supply. But you must score and document the EU-origin elements. Keep the weighting modest: assigning too much can expose the award to challenge for breaching the "not decisive" requirement, so ensure your technical and financial criteria remain robust and dominant.

For tenderers, expect to supply verifiable evidence of supply-chain composition, hardware and software design/manufacturing locations, and Union-funded R&D integration. Vague claims will not score well.

Common misconceptions

"Union added value means EU-only procurement." No. Article 32(3)(d) permits third-country hardware where EU hardware is not feasible, provided it contributes to security of supply.

"It can override a better price or technical offer." No. Because it is ancillary and not decisive, it cannot reject an otherwise superior bid on added-value grounds alone.

"It applies to all cloud procurements." No. Article 32(1) is limited to innovative cloud computing services and AI systems; the assurance-level rules in Article 30 apply more broadly.

"The weighting is fixed by law." No. CADA sets no fixed weight; the 15/120 figure is an indicative ceiling suggested in Recital 67, leaving authorities discretion subject to keeping the criterion ancillary and not decisive.

This is general information about a draft EU regulation, not legal advice.