Summary Under the proposed Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA), the common procurement framework operates strictly on a cost-recovery basis. Article 40(3) of the proposal explicitly states that revenues generated from procurement fees constitute "internal assigned revenues" within the meaning of Article 21(3)(a) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509. These funds are assigned exclusively to cover the costs of procurement activities carried out under Article 37. Crucially, any revenue remaining after covering those specific costs "shall be entered into the general budget of the Union." This mechanism ensures the Commission does not generate profit from public-sector procurement, and any surplus is returned to the general EU budget rather than retained for discretionary spending.
Detail
The Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA), as proposed in COM(2026) 502 final, establishes a common procurement framework to leverage the collective buying power of Union entities and Member State contracting authorities. A central pillar of this framework is its financial sustainability model, governed by Article 40. For public-sector bodies considering participation, understanding the destination of fee revenueβparticularly any surplusβis vital for budgetary planning and compliance.
The Cost-Recovery Mandate
The proposal is clear: the common procurement framework is not a revenue-generating instrument for the European Commission. Article 40(1) establishes that the costs arising from procurement activities under this Chapter shall be jointly financed by participating entities through fees levied by the Commission.
Article 40(4) further refines this principle, mandating that fees must be:
- Set in advance;
- Proportionate to the estimated costs of the activities for which fees are chargeable;
- Determined in a cost-effective way, reflecting practices of comparable procurement frameworks; and
- Sufficient to cover those costs.
This structure ensures that the fees charged to participating entities are not arbitrary but are directly linked to the operational expenses of the procurement platform, including platform development, management, and ancillary support services.
The Fate of Surplus Revenue: Article 40(3)
The most critical provision regarding the financial flow of these fees is found in Article 40(3). This article dictates the legal status and ultimate destination of the revenue collected. The text states:
"Revenues generated by the fees shall constitute internal assigned revenues within the meaning of Article 21(3), point (a), of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509. Those revenues shall be assigned to cover the costs of the procurement activities carried out pursuant to Article 37. Any revenue remaining after covering those costs shall be entered into the general budget of the Union."
This provision establishes a strict two-step hierarchy for the use of funds:
- Primary Assignment to Article 37 Costs: The revenue is first and foremost "assigned" to cover the specific costs of the procurement activities detailed in Article 37. These activities include the Commission acting as a central purchasing body to procure data centre services, cloud computing services, software, and AI systems on behalf of participating entities. It also covers ancillary support such as technical infrastructure, advice on procurement procedures, and the management of framework contracts.
- Disposition of Surplus: If the fees collected exceed the actual costs incurred for these specific activities, the surplus cannot be retained by the Commission for its own operational use or other discretionary projects. The regulation mandates that "any revenue remaining after covering those costs shall be entered into the general budget of the Union."
Legal Context: Internal Assigned Revenues
The reference to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 (the Financial Regulation) is legally significant. By classifying the fee revenue as "internal assigned revenues" under Article 21(3)(a) of that Regulation, CADA aligns the procurement framework with established EU financial governance standards.
Under the Financial Regulation, assigned revenues are revenues that are earmarked to finance specific expenditures. This classification ensures transparency and accountability. It prevents the commingling of these funds with other budgetary lines in a way that could obscure the true cost of the procurement service. It also ensures that the revenue stream is legally bound to the specific purpose of funding the procurement framework, rather than becoming general revenue for the Commission's broader administrative operations.
Initial Establishment Costs and Reimbursement
The proposal also addresses the initial setup phase. Article 40(2) allows for the initial costs of establishing the common procurement activities, including the development of the common procurement platform, to be initially borne by the general budget of the Union. However, this is a transitional measure. These initial costs must be reimbursed by the participating entities over a period not exceeding three years from the date they were borne.
This mechanism reinforces the long-term principle that the framework is self-sustaining through participant fees. Once the initial setup costs are reimbursed, the ongoing fees collected are intended solely to cover the operational costs of the procurement activities. Any surplus generated during this period, or in subsequent years, follows the rule in Article 40(3) and is transferred to the general budget.
What this means for you
For public-sector procurement officers, contracting authorities, and financial controllers, the treatment of surplus revenue under CADA offers specific assurances and operational implications:
- No Profit for the Commission: You can be confident that the fees you pay are not designed to generate a profit margin for the European Commission. The framework is strictly cost-recovery oriented. If the Commission underestimates costs or if fees are set higher than actual expenses, the excess does not stay within the Commission's budget but is returned to the general EU budget.
- Budgetary Predictability and Transparency: Because the revenue is "assigned" to specific costs, participating entities should expect transparent reporting on how fees are calculated and how they are spent. The cost-recovery nature implies that fee adjustments should be driven by actual cost variations, not by a desire to accumulate reserves.
- Protection Against Misuse of Funds: The classification as internal assigned revenue under the Financial Regulation subjects these funds to standard EU financial controls, audits, and reporting requirements. This provides a layer of protection against the mismanagement of funds and ensures the procurement framework operates within strict financial discipline.
- Transitional Reimbursement: If your entity participates in the early stages of the framework, be aware that your fees may contribute to reimbursing initial setup costs incurred by the EU budget. However, this is a one-time transition mechanism, limited to a maximum of three years, after which the framework should be fully self-sustaining through operational fees.
Common misconceptions
Misconception: The Commission profits from CADA procurement fees.
- Reality: This is incorrect. Article 40(3) explicitly mandates that any surplus revenue after covering the costs of Article 37 activities "shall be entered into the general budget of the Union." The Commission does not retain excess funds for its own use. The framework is strictly cost-recovery oriented.
Misconception: Fee revenue can be diverted to fund other Commission projects.
- Reality: No. The revenue is "assigned" specifically to cover the costs of procurement activities under Article 37. Only the surplus, after these specific costs are fully met, goes to the general budget. It cannot be diverted to fund unrelated Commission initiatives or administrative overheads outside the procurement framework.
Misconception: Participants are permanently subsidizing the EU budget.
- Reality: While initial setup costs may be reimbursed by participants under Article 40(2), this is a transitional measure limited to three years. The long-term model is designed to be self-sustaining through fees that cover actual costs. Any surplus returns to the general budget, meaning participants are not continuously overpaying to subsidize the EU.
Related
- What happens if a CADA procurement derogation is challenged?
- CADA Procurement Fees: What They Fund and Where Surplus Goes
- Will small public bodies be able to afford CADA procurement fees?
- Why does CADA add a Union added value criterion to procurement?
- Who pays for CADA procurement fees? Article 40 explained
This is general information about a draft EU regulation, not legal advice.